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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY, FOREIGN POLICY
AND "NICE"
SUBSTITUTABILITY,
LAWS
By BENJAMIN A. MOST and HARVEY STARR*
INTRODUCTION

A

pair of basic problemsappearto have impededthedevelopment
ofan integrative
understanding
ofinternational
and foreignpolicy
phenomena.The firsthas to do withthe potentialforforeignpolicy
substitutability:
throughtime and acrossspace, similarfactorscould
different
plausiblybe expectedto trigger
foreignpolicyacts.The second
problemconcernsthepotentialexistenceof "sometimestrue,"domainspecificlaws. It is thelogicaloppositeof thesubstitution
problem:differentprocessescould plausiblybe expectedto lead to similarresults.
Neitherproblemappearstobe wellunderstood
in thecurrent
literature;
if anything,
standardresearchpracticessuggestthatbothare ignored
Taken together,
entirely.
Nevertheless,
theyare potentially
important.
in developinga cumulative
theysuggestthatscholarswhoare interested
base of integrative
knowledgeabout foreignpolicyand international
relationsphenomenashouldrecognizethat:
I. If writerson the foreignpolicybehaviorsof governments
define
"islandsof theory"in termsof concretephenomena,theirworkwill
notyieldbroadunderstanding.
If governments
behavedifferently
to
nationalgoalsand,underat least
pursuetheir(perhapsheterogeneous)
certainconditions
nationsmaysubstitute
one meansforanother,then
all of the behaviorsthattendto be studiedin fragmented
fashion
need to be conceivedfromthe outset notas separateand distinct
of which will eventuallybe intephenomena,the understanding
grated-but ratheras commensurable
behaviorsor componentparts
of abstractconceptualpuzzles.
of thestandardapproachesfortestingmodelsand hy2. Applications
pothesesare likelyto producemisleadingresultsand lead analyststo
rejecttheoriesand models thatare "good," "nice," and "useful,"even
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"true."If itis plausibleto argue
iftheyare notgeneral,or universally
reasonsand with
goals,fordifferent
thatstatesmaypursuedifferent
thenit maybe usefulto reconsider
different
degreesof effectiveness,
applicable
to searchfora "true,""general,"or universally
theefforts
explanationof what theydo. It mightinsteadbe more sensibleto
searchformodelsor theoriesthatoperate,hold, or are valid only
conditions.
prescribed
undercertainexplicitly
As a consequenceof our analysis,we concludethatthereis a need

to reexamine some of the "grand" theoreticalapproaches found in the
"traditional"literature.A new synthesisof traditionand science and of
grand, middle, and narrow approaches seems to be needed. Finally, in
contrastto argumentssuch as those presentedby Waltz and Singer, we
find that the most fruitfulavenues for theorizingand research are at
the microlevel,in which the focusis on decision making,expected utility
calculations,and foreignpolicy interactionprocesses.'
COMMON RESEARCH PRACTICES

Several basic researchpracticesand procedureshave increasinglycome
to characterize much of the currentquantitative research on foreign
policy and internationalphenomena.2
Empirical 'puzzles" and empiricallydefinedislands.Recent theoretical
and quantitativeempirical researchon foreignpolicy and international
relationshas tended to focuson the "middle level" in an apparent effort
to develop "islands of theory,"or solutionsto middle-range"puzzles."
While scholars argue that they are ultimatelyconcerned with understanding why states do what they do, they have eschewed effortsat
"grand theory."They have tended to specialize theirresearch-becoming arms race experts,alliance theorists,war analysts,studentsof arms
transfers,specialistson the uses of foreigneconomic policy,expertson
processesof internationalnegotiationand conflictresolution,and so on.3
I Kenneth N. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
J.David Singer, "Accountingfor InternationalWar: The State of the Discipline,"
Journalof Peace Researchi8 (No. i, 198I), i-i8.
2 Exceptions
could readily be cited. Our contentionis only that the practicesoutlined
below are typicalof much of what is done, and that they seem to reflecthow scholars
approach theirresearchproblems.
3 Analystswho work with the WEIS, CREON, and COPDAB
eventsdata sets adopt a
differentapproach, of course. Rosenau's "pre-theory"of foreignpolicy and its various
extensionsand testsalso quite clearlydepartfromthepatternby hypothesizingthatdifferent
explanationsmay hold in differenttypesof states.See JamesN. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories
and Theories of Foreign Policy,"in Rosenau,ed., The Scientific
StudyofForeignPolicy(New
York: Free Press, 1971), 95-149; JamesN. Rosenau and Gary Hoggard, "Foreign Policy
Behavior in Dyadic Relationships:Testing a Pre-TheoreticalExtension,"in Rosenau, ed.,
ComparingForeignPolicies(New York: JohnWiley & Sons, 1974), I17-49; Maurice A. East,
1979);
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Some have asked why nations go to war. Others have dealt with why
alliances form or dissolve. Possible explanations and effectsof arms
transfershave been analyzed by a thirdgroup of researchers.Still others
have focused on arms races, and so on.4
Some scholars specialize and focus on one phenomenon or type of
event because the subject seems to them to have an intrinsicappeal.
They regard the phenomenon,in and of itself,as a concept; theirtypical
goals are to understandits causes or consequences. Other analysts,viewing their chosen empirical behavior or event as an indicator of some
more overarchingconcept, reason that an understandingof the phenomenon will eventuallyinformthem about the concept; examples are
scholars who focus on war fromthe perspectiveof Galtung's structural
theoryof aggression.5They argue thatprogresstowardan understanding
of conceptualrelationshipswill come mostrapidlyiftheyfocusnarrowly,
concentrateon a given empiricalphenomenon,and studyit in isolation.
At a minimum,an island of theorywill emerge;an area of understanding
will be established.If, in the meantime,other analystshave been successful in investigatingother concrete behaviors and have produced
islands of theirown, it should eventuallybe possible to go further:the
"Size and Foreign Policy Behavior," WorldPolitics25 (July1973), 556-76. Our contention
is only that such researcherstend to be the exceptionratherthan the rule. It should also
be said that a numberof analystsreportnongeneralfindings;e.g., resultsthat hold in the
i9th centurybut not in the 20th,or thatapply to major powers but not to minorones. The
pointto note,however,is thatthemajorityof theseanalystsinitiallylook for-and apparently
expectto find-general relationships.They have no initialtheoreticalexpectationthattheir
model should be applicable to some limiteddomain or that it should be useful only under
certainconditions.
4 For researchthat adopts a narrow focus on war, see Benjamin A. Most and Harvey
Starr,"Diffusion,Reinforcement,
Geopolitics,and the Spread of War," AmericanPolitical
Science Review 74 (December ig80), 932-46, and Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most,
"Contagion and Border Effectson ContemporaryAfricanConflict,"ComparativePolitical
Studies i6 (April i983), 92-117. For a studydealing exclusivelywith alliances,see Brian L.
Job,"Membershipin Inter-NationAlliances, i815-i965: An ExplorationUtilizing Mathematical Models," in Dina A. Zinnes and JohnV. Gillespie, eds., MathematicalModels in
International
Relations(New York: Praeger, 1976),74-iog. For a studyfocusingexclusively
on arms races,see Philip A. Schrodt,"Richardson'sModel as a Markov Process,"ibid., i5675. Researchdealing exclusivelywith internationalarms transfersis reportedby Ilan Peleg,
"MilitaryProductionin Third World Countries,"in Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley,
eds., Threats,Weaponsand ForeignPolicy (BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage Publications, i980),
209-30. For an analysis focused exclusivelyon internationalnegotiations,see Glenn H.
Snyder and Paul Diesing, ConflictAmongNations (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1977). Analystswho have writtenabout "islandsof theory"in internationalrelationsinclude
Harold Guetzkow, "Long Range Researchin InternationalRelations,"AmericanPerspective
4 (Fall 1950), 421-40, and Nigel Forward,The Field ofNations(Boston: Little,Brown, 1971).
5 See, forexample,Maurice A. East, "StatusDiscrepancyand Violence in the International
System: An Empirical Analysis," in JamesN. Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice A.
East, eds., The Analysisof International
Politics(New York: Free Press, 1972), 299-3ig, and
Michael D. Wallace, War and Rank AmongNations (Lexington,Mass.: Lexington Books,
1973).
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war island would be linked with other middle-range theoriesof alliance behavior, arms transfers,defense expenditures,and so on. This
theoreticalsynthesis,or bridgingof the islands of middle-rangetheory,
is expected to provide a more abstract,broad-gauge, or overarching
understandingof foreignpolicy and internationalbehavior.
laws and "always-true"
theories.The tendency
Empiricalgeneralizations,
to define puzzles or researchquestions in termsof particular,concrete
empiricalphenomena and to focuson one but onlyone typeof event
at a time combines with the fact that most scholars who study foreign
or scientifically
seem to
policy and internationalrelationssystematically
think of social laws and theoriesas being either true or false.6As we
have noted previously,the search forempiricalgeneralizationsseems to
have become the sine qua non of at least those scholars who study
internationalrelationsquantitatively.To understandor explain a phenomenon such as an overt militaryattack,theyconsider it necessaryto
identifythe factor(s)that, alone or in various combinations,correlate
with the occurrencesof attacksor thatseem generallyuseful according
to some statisticalcriterion for postdictingthe occurrencesof attacks
in the data set in question. Although a few exceptionsmay be noted,
the most common view is that a "good" explanandum is one that is
generallyassociated throughtime or across space with attacks; a "less
than good" explanandum is one thatis not. Research proceeds by identifyingand retainingthe formerwhile rejectingand abandoning the
latter.7
On firstconsideration,these practicesseem largely commonsensical.
They do not seem to be at all problematic.Indeed, the practicesare so
uncontroversialthattheyare seldom discussed in the currentliterature.
Researchers may be led astray,however, if they narrowly focus their
research on only one type of empirical foreignpolicy behavior, define
6
to MathematicalSociology(Glencoe, Ill.: The Free
See JamesS. Coleman, Introduction
Press of Glencoe, i964), 5i6.
7We are referringhere to standard uses of the so-called "general covering law" or
"refutationist"approach developed by scholars such as Hempel and Popper. For a brief
rehearsal,see: GregoryA. Raymond,"Introduction:ComparativeAnalysisand Nomological
Explanation,"in Charles W. Kegley,Jr.,GregoryA. Raymond,RobertM. Rood, and Richard
AnalysisofForeignPolicy(Columbia:
Eventsand theComparative
A. Skinner,eds.,International
Universityof South Carolina Press, 1975), 41-51. The reasoningunderlyingthis approach
in syllogisticform:If a "true"(i.e.,universal)law existsbetween
can be crudelyreconstructed
some conceptsX and Y, thenthatlaw shouldalwayshold in the empiricalworld and should
be evidencedby whateverare theappropriateassociationsbetweenthe respectiveoperational
indicatorsof the concepts,xi and yi. Empirical analyses are conducted to test for such
associationsbetween the occurrencesof the xi and yi in the expectationthat those results
will informus about whetheror not a law actuallyexistsbetweenX and Y. The absence
of the associationbetween the xi and yi allows us, if the reasoningis sound, to reject the
X/Y law, while the appearance of the anticipatedxi/yirelationshipallows us to say that the
data are consistentwith,or supportthe existenceof, the X/Y law.

FOREIGN

POLICY

SUBSTITUTABILITY

387

problemsor potentialislandsin termsof such concretephenomena,
searchexclusively
forempirical-level
generalizations,
and equate laws
withuniversaltruths.
PROBLEM
THE OVERLOOKED

POTENTIAL

No. I:
FOR POLICY

SUBSTITUTION

The practicesdescribedabove are likelyto lead to a moreabstract
understanding
ofwhystatesdo whattheydo onlyiftheydo notsubstitute
one empirically
distinct
foreign
policyor behaviorforanotherin pursuit
of their(perhapsheterogeneous)
nationalgoals. If foreignpoliciescan
indeedbe alternative
routesbywhichdecisionmakersattaintheirgoals,
thenit would seemplausiblethatdecisionmakerswho are confronted
withsome problemor subjectedto somestimuluscould,underat least
certain
substitute
onesuchmeans
If thatis thecase,
conditions,
foranother.
any factor,stimulus,or problemthattriggers
someparticulartypeof
empiricalforeign
policyresponsecould,underdifferent
conditions,
trig-

ger other,apparentlydistinct,apparentlyincommensurablebehaviors. If
the argument is valid, similar factorscould lead to distinctconcrete or
empirical foreignpolicy responses.
The confoundingeffectsof this potential for foreignpolicy substitutabilitycan hardly be overemphasized. For example, Realists have
argued that statesseek the goal of securityin the Westphalian self-help
system.To the extentthatstatesdo indeed pursue such a grand or metaconceptual goal (Y), and in principlehave a varietyof partiallysubstitutable,alternativemeans war (yi), alliance formation(y2), arms importation(y3),arms increases (Y4) for attainingthe goal, a given presumed causal factor(xi; e.g., an increase in an opponent's arms) could
logicallybe expected to explain why the decision makers of a given state
would be willing to adopt some attempt to resolve the problem, yi.
Because the stimulus (xi) could be expected to triggerthe adoption of
yi by some decision makers while othersmightchoose differentoptions
such as y2, y3, ... , yn, however, an understandingof whichparticular
yi would be adopted by differentdecision makers under differentconditions would involve a considerationof how they make comparisons
across,and eventuallychoose from,the range of those available options.
It would require thatanalystsfocus on more than a single typeor form
of foreignpolicy behavior,rethinkthe strategyof focusingon particular
empirical phenomena, and reconsiderthe constructionof middle-range
islands of theoryon the basis of concrete,unabstractedphenomena.8
8 If yI, y2, . . ., yn are all potentialmeans forattainingan assumed foreignpolicygoal,
then each yi is a potentiallyvalid indicatorof Y (e.g., the initiationof an overt military
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Two examples should help to clarifythesepoints.First,let us imagine
a simple, totallydeterministic,world in which the development of a
"problem" (X) is invariablysufficient-butperhaps not empiricallynecessary foran effortto resolvetheproblem(Y). Whereverand whenever
X occurs,Y follows. The only complicationis thateffortsto resolve the
problem (Y) can take any of threedifferentempirical forms(yI, y2, y3)
which are not necessarilymutuallyexclusive(i.e., an actorcould respond
to X by adopting any one or any combinationof them). If (i) xi is a
valid and reliable indicatorof X, (2) yI, y2, and y3 are valid and reliable
complementaryindicatorsof Y. and (3) xi and -xi denote the presence
or absence of the problem X while yi and -yi denote the presence or
absence of a given attemptto resolve the problem, the following case
structuresare possible:
Case i

XI

Case 2
Case 3
Case 4

XI

-yI

Xi

-yI

Case 5
Case 6

Case 7
Case 8

XI

-xI
-xi

-xI

-xi

yI

YI

-yI
YI

-Y
-YI

-y2
Y2
-y2
Y2

-y3
-y3

Y3

Y3

-Y2

-Y3

-Y2

-y3

3
Y2
-Y2

-Y3

y3

Y
Y

Y
Y

-Y

Y
Y
Y

Analystswho recognize the complementarityof the yi and focus on
abstractattemptsto resolvethe problem(Y) ratherthan on the specific
empirical formsthat such solutionstake would not be at all confused
by this pattern;each timexi appears, Y follows.Because Y also appears
when xi is not present,however,these analystswould conclude thatX,
as indicated by xi, is sufficient(but not necessary)forY. Other analysts
who focus narrowly and specialize in attemptsto understand the occurrenceof any one and only one-of the concreteyi behaviorswould
run the risk of overlooking the relationship,however; the occurrence
of xi sometimes but not always precedes any particularyi. In short,
X, as indicated by xi, would not appear to be sufficient(or necessary)
for any one of the yi.9
strikeor an increasein defensespendingarc complementary
indicatorsof theconcept"efforts
to maintainor enhance security"or "foreignpolicy means"). Once this is recognized,the
problem is easily understood:A focus on any one yi fails to provide full coverage of the
range of possible behaviorsin the "means" concept.Analystswho focuson only one yi are
thusfocusingonlyon "successful"occurrences.To thatextent,an examinationof thepossible
sufficiencyrelationshipbetween any presumed causal factor(xi) and the yi is precluded.
The pointhere is analogous to our criticismof analystswho focusonlyon actual occurrences
of war. See Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr,"Case Selection,Conceptualizationand
Basic Logic in the Studyof War," AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience26 (November i982),
834-56, and "Conceptualizing War: Consequences for Theory and Research,"Journalof
ConflictResolution27 (March I983), 137-59.
9 The readermay thinkthatresearchers
could readilyresolvethisproblemby constructing
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A considerationof the hypotheticalinteractionsamong states m, i,
and j in columns I to 3 in part A of Table i may clarifythe problem
further.The mth state increasesits defensespending in each alternative
round. States i and j respond by increasingtheirown expenditures(at
t2), by offeringto form an alliance (at t4), by dissolvingan alliance or
seeking foreignarms acquisitions respectively(at t6) and, respectively,
by seeking to negotiateor attack (at t8).
Recognizing that the illustrationis purelyhypotheticaland does not
exhaust the full range of states' possible foreignpolicy behaviors, the
basic point should be obvious: the situation would appear chaotic to
analysts who ignored or overlooked the substitutability
potential and
focusedon only a single typeof behavior.The typicalarms race theorist
who focuses on reciprocatedincreases in defense spending would discover that increases by one state sometimesdo, but sometimesdo not,
lead to similar responses by other states. The alliance theoristwould
discoverthatan increasein defensespendingantedatesan effortto form
an alliance in one instance,but that other such increases precede the
breakup of an alliance or states'completeinactivityin thealliance sphere.
The war theoristand the expert on arms transferswould encounter
similarcomplexities.Stepped-up defensespendingprecedes an attack in
one case but also antedates conciliatoryeffortsin another; spending
increases generally do not, but in one case does, appear to lead to an
effortto importarms.
Thus, analystswho elect to focuson only one of the behaviorsshown
in the table are likely to be led astray.The strategywould make sense
only if decision makers of all states responded identicallyto identical
stimuli and were unable to substitute.If, however, the behaviors of
decision makers of differentstatescould in facttake a varietyof forms,
there would be no reason to expect a systematic,sufficientrelationship
between any initial condition and any other specificform of foreign
policy behavior. To the extentthat decision makers have some latitude
in their choice of options and are sometimes able to substituteone
alternative for another, a given factor could be expected to lead to,
stimulate,or 'cause' a varietyof empiricallydistinctforeignpolicyacts,
events,or behaviors.
The substitutability
phenomenon,then,providesa possible answer to
some compositescale of the variousyi. In the past, the fashionwould have been to factor
analyze the yi. Such a strategywould work only if it is reasonableto assume that a given
phenomenonyi invariablyindicates the concept Y. As the discussion in the next section
suggests,such a postulate might not be plausible. While the initiationof conflictmay
sometimes reflectthe desire of decision makers to establish (or reestablish)their state's
externalsecurityor viability,for example, the same behavior could reflecttheirdesire to
increasetheirgovernment'sviabilityin the face of domesticpressures.
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TABLE 1
HYPOTHETICAL

ACTION/REACTION

PROCESS

A
States

Time

m

tl
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6
t7
t8

x4
x4
x4
x4

i

q

x4

x4

00

00

x5

x5

00

00

x6

x7

00

00

x8

x9

00

00

x4: Increase defensespending
x5: Offerto forman alliance
x6: Dissolve an alliance with statek
x7: Seek to importarms
x8: Seek to negotiateoutstandinggrievances
x9: Initiatean attack on the threateningstate
00: No behavior

B
States

Time

m

tl
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6
t7
t8

X2
X2
X2
X2

i

j

p

q

X2

X2

00

00

X2

X2

00

00

X2

X2

00

00

X3

X3

00

00

X2: Increase national defensecapacity(C)
X3: Decrease national defenserisk (R)
00: No behavior
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C

States
Time

m

tl
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6
t7
t8

X1

X1
X1
X1

p

q

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

X1

XI: Decision makers attemptto have C > R

D
PERIOD-END

STATUS

States
Time

tl
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6
t7
t8

m
C>R
C<R
C>R
C<R
C>R
C<R
C>R
C<R

q

I1
C<R
C>R
C<R
C>R
C<R
C>R
C<R
C>R

C<R
C>R
C<R
C>R
C<R
C>R
C<R
C>R

C<R
C<R
C<R
C<R
C<R
C<R
C<R
C<R

C>R
C>R
C>R
C>R
C>R
C>R
C>R
C>R

the most intriguingof Zinnes's "puzzles." Posing the question, "Do
nations interact?" she examines the work on arms races an area in
could have importanteffects and concludes that
which substitutability
"the overall and overwhelmingresult is that nationsdo not interactin
thisdomain."IoThe few studiesthatdo discoverinteractiondo not focus
exclusivelyon armamentsbut on overall interactionpatternswhich are
events.
based on a wide range of hostile/cooperative
Although a thoroughunderstandingof the best apparent solution to
this difficultymust await the considerationof a few additional points,
StudiesQuar1oDina A. Zinnes, "Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher,"International
terly24 (Septemberi980), 315-42, at 323 (emphasisin original).
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in
its basic outlinescan be traced.If scholarsare genuinelyinterested
understanding
whystatesdo whattheydo, theyneed to movebeyond
on particular
to focusseparately
concretebehaviors.Ratherthan
efforts
they
empiricalphenomena,
questionsaboutspecific
askingmiddle-range
were
with
the
with
which
they
initial
"grand"
question
shouldbegin
allegedlyconcernedin thefirstplace;ratherthanaskingwhystatesarm,
formalliances,importarms,negotiate,attack,and so on, theyshould
beginby askingwhateach behaviordoes,or at leastcould,represent.
such
Thus, we need to returnto themoregenericconceptualizations,

as "response to threat" or "response to uncertaintyunder the Westphalian securitydilemma," that appeared in the traditionalliterature
under the rubricof "security,""nationalinterest,"or "balance of power."
A whole range of activitiesthatare currentlydiscussed under headings
such as trade,aid, internationallaw, regimes,internationalorganization,
and so on, could be conceptualized more broadly as "adaptation for
coordination or collaboration" or some similarlyoverarchingconcept.
The point to be emphasized, however, is the need to reconceptualize
exactlywhatit is thatwe want to study,and why.Studentsof international
relationshave, in many cases, actually reifiedthe operational indicators
of internationalinteraction.We have studied war qua war, alliances qua
alliances,and have tendedto overlookthebroaderinternationalprocesses
and phenomena that such specificformsof behavior represent.
The resultsof thisnarrownesshave been recognized in recentreviews
of the alliance literatureby Ward and Job." Both authorsnote thatthere
has been little cumulation or theoreticaldevelopment. Both conclude
thatalliance researchis focusedtoo narrowly and ratherunfruitfully
on questions such as the alliance/warrelationship.While neither calls
explicitlyfor reconceptualefforts,both suggestthat the time may have
come to move beyond the studyof alliancesper se and effortsto develop
alliance theory. Job in particular seems to recommend asking what
alliances do (or under certain conceptualizations,could) "really" represent.

12

--Michael Don Ward, "ResearchGaps in AllianceDynamics: LiteratureReview," mimeo.
(Evanston,Ill.: NorthwesternUniversity,i980), and Brian L. Job,"Grins Without Cats: In
Pursuitof Knowledge of InternationalAlliances,"in P. TerrenceHopmann, Dina A. Zinnes,
RelationsResearch,Monograph Series
and J.David Singer,eds., Cumulationin International
in World Affairs,Vol. i8, Book 3 (Graduate School of InternationalStudies,Universityof
Denver, 198I).
1 The need to reversethe tendencyto attackinternational
and foreignpolicyphenomena
in fragmented,piecemeal fashioncan be defendedon othergrounds. The point has been
tellinglymade by both Ostrom and Boynton.See Elinor Ostrom,"Beyond Positivism:An
of PoliticalInquiry(BeverlyHills,
Introductionto This Volume," in Ostrom,ed., Strategies
Calif.: Sage Publications,i982), 11-28, and G. RobertBoynton,"Linking ProblemDefinition
and Research Activities:Using Formal Languages," in JudithA. Gillespie and Dina A.
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are shownin Table
formulation
ofone suchunifying
The beginnings
decisionmakerswho perThe "image"is one of value-maximizing
dilemma.A perceived
to be confronted
witha security
ceivethemselves
inequality(i.e., C 6 R) acts as the
imbalancein the Capacity-to-Risk
motiveforce;givenan imbalance,decisionmakersare inclinedor "willing" to attemptto reverseit by adoptingsome policyinitiativethatis
likelyto increasetheirdefensecapacityor decreasetheirrisks.This
"probable"behavioris expectedto interactwithwhat is "possible."'3
bytherangeofavailable
Putsimply,
decisionmakerswillbe constrained
if,and onlyif,
policyoptions;theywill adopta givenpolicyalternative
2.

theyhave both the "willingness"and the "opportunity"to do so.'4

Assumingforthemomentthattheaxiomsin Table 2 applyto states
m,i, andj, thateach statehas unlimitedimplementation
capabilityor
to act,and thatm viewsi andj as riskswhilei andj view
opportunities

m-but not each other-as possible sources of danger, the interactions
among statesm, i, andj in partA of Table i begin to become intelligible.
The apparentlydiverse behaviors and acts become commensurable. If
the formulationand the just-mentionedauxiliary conditions had been
Zinnes, eds., MissingElementsin PoliticalInquiry(BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
I982), 43-60. Perhaps J. Bronowski,however,puts the point most clearly:
All scienceis the searchforunityin hidden likenesses.. . . The scientistlooks fororder
in appearancesof natureby exploringsuch likenesses.For orderdoes not displayitself;
if it can be said to be thereat all, it is not there for the mere looking. There is no
way of pointinga fingeror a camera at it; order must be discoveredand, in a deep
sense,it must be created.What we see, as we see it,is mere disorder.... [Full grown]
science grows froma comparison.It has seized a likeness between two unlike appearances. . . The progressof science is the discoveryat each step of a new order
whichgives unityto what seemed unlike (Bronowski,Scienceand Human Values[New
York: Harper Torchbooks, i965], 13-15).
3 Harold and Margaret Sprout, An Ecological Paradigmfor the Study of International
Politics,Center of InternationalStudies,PrincetonUniversity,ResearchMonograph No. 30
(Princeton,1968),and Harold and MargaretSprout,"EnvironmentalFactors in the Study
of InternationalPolitics,"in JamesN. Roseneau,ed., International
Politicsand ForeignPolicy,
rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, i969), 41-56.
14The careful reader will note that major elements of "Realism" and the "security
dilemma" are being formalizedin Table 2. See, forexample,Hans J. Morgenthau,Politics
AmongNations,5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); RobertJervis,"Cooperation
Under the SecurityDilemma," WorldPolitics30 (January1978), i67-214, and Robert 0.
Keohane, "Theory of World Politics:StructuralRealism and Beyond" (Paper presentedat
the Annual Meetingsof the American Political Science Association,Denver, i982). These
elementsare being formalizedaround an expected utilityframeworkthat draws on the
"cognitivebehaviorism"of the Sprouts(fn. 13) in a mannereschewed by Realist theorists.
While the model is somewhatsimilarto the Realistapproach,therefore,
it is also consistent
withtheSprouts'dictumregardingenvironmentaldeterminism:i.e.,motivatingfactorsneed
to be mapped throughdecision makers' perceptionseven if all decision makers perceive
alike and theydo not make a (statistical)difference.Mapping throughthe decision makers
is a logical requirement,not a statisticalconcern; nothingwould happen (no relationships
would hold) ifdecisionmakersdid not exist.(We departfromSproutand Sprout,however,
insofaras we see policy initiationsas "outcomes" of the interplaybetween what decision
makers want to do and are capable of doing.)
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TABLE 2
SECURITYDILEMMA FORMULATION
A UNIFIED ACTOR/NATIONAL

Axiom 1: The decision makers of an nth stateare, or can be treatedas,
unifiedand value-maximizingactorswho possessperfectinformationregardingall optionsand theirconsequences.
Axiom 2: At any given pointin time,the decisionmakersin an nth state
perceivethat theyhave a certainnationaldefensecapacity(Cnt) and are
(Rnt).a
confrontedby some degreeof nationalriskor vulnerability
Axiom 3: The decisionmakersof an nthstateare motivatedor willingto
establishthe followinginequality:
Cnt > Rnt
viable and maini.e., the decisionmakerswant to be unconditionally
tain at least local supremacy.
Postulate 1: Only if the decision makers of an nth state command the
necessaryobjectivecapabilityor opportunity(0) to adopt some unilateral
policyinitiative,thenthe adoptionof thatinitiative.
Postulate2: If the decisionmakersof an nthstateperceivethattheirstate's
defensecapacityhas been neglectedor allowed to deterioratebetweentO
and tI, theywill perceivethatCntO> Cntl.
Postulate3: If a given stateincreasesits nationaldefensecapacitybetween
tOand tl and the decisionmakersin an nthstateperceivethataction as a
threat,theywill perceivethatRntO< Rntl.
Postulate4: If Cntl < Rntl, thenthe decisionmakersof thenth statewill
be motivatedto adopt some policyinitiativedesignedto increaseCn and/
or decreaseRn at t2; i.e., if the decisionmakersperceivethattheyare only
conditionallyviable at ti, thentheywill be willingto increasetheircapacitiesor decreasetheirrisks.
Postulate5: If, and onlyif,the decisionmakersof an nth statecommand
the necessarycapacity (or opportunity)to adopt some unilateralpolicy
initiativeand theyare motivated(or willing)to do so, then the adoption
of thatinitiative.
aGiven the purpose of the illustration,it is not importantto consider how one might
operationalize either Cnt or Rnt. Only three points need to be noted. First, it should be
understood that both capacities (C) and risks (R) are conceptualized here in terms of
decision makers' perceptions.Put simply,a state's defensecapacitiesand the risks it confrontsare as theyare recognizedand understoodby the decision makers. Consistentwith
this conceptualization,the capacitiesof "friendly"or distantstatesmay be discounted by
an nth state'sdecisionmakersin theircalculationof Rnt; similarly,the capacitiesof friendly,
and especiallyallied, statescould be counted by the nth state'sdecision makers as supplemental sources of Cnt. Finally, it should be clear that capacities (C) and risks (R) may
differfrom the decision makers' objective capabilitiesor opportunities(see Postulate 1),
which affectpolicy initiativesregardlessof whetheror not theyare (accurately)perceived
by the decision makers.
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in place at the outset,it would have been possible to deduce that each
statewould adopt some measure to increasecapacity(C) or decrease risk
(R) in each successive round (see part B of Table i). Each of these
conceptswould have broughttogethera number of hithertoapparently
diverse behaviors.Within the contextof the model, increasesin defense
expenditures,offersof alliance, and effortsto importarms could have
been seen as commensurable; they could have been recognized as alternativeindicatorsof decision makers' effortsto increase theirdefense
capacity. Alliance dissolutions,offersto negotiate,and militarystrikes
could also have been rendered commensurable as effortsto decrease
risk.It would have been possibleto go further;effortsto increasecapacity
or decrease risk-along with the distinctempirical behaviors that each
embraces within the formulation-could have been linked in turn to
decision makers' effortsto manage theirrespectiveC-to-R inequalities
(see part C of Table i).
With all of this in mind, consider the behaviors of nationsp and q
in columns 4 and 5 of Table i above. While statesm, i, andj display a
wide range of behaviors-presumably in an effortto manipulate their
Capacity-to-Riskratios-p and q remain completelyinactive. Viewed
at the raw empiricallevel,thereappears to be no consistencywhatsoever
in the actions of the five states. Each responds differently.Even for
analystswho recognize the underlyingunityof the actions of the first
threestates,thebehaviorsofp and q would probablyappear to be distinct
departures from the expected pattern.While the acts of nations m, i,
andj are consistentwith the postulatethatthe decision makers in those
nationsperceivea securityproblemand are thereforeundertakingpolicy
initiativesto increase theirdefensecapabilitiesor decrease theirrisks,p
and q appear to behave quite differently.
They do nothing at all; the
conceptualizationdoes not seem to apply.
The point to be noted, however, is that statesp and q could be
imbedded in the patternif one began with the model in Table 2 and
also knew the following: (i) The decision makers of p view m as a
potentialthreatthat upsets theirC-to-R ratio throughoutthe sequence,
but theylack thecapabilityto undertakeany actionto resetthe inequality
(see Postulates i and 5 in Table 2); (2) the decision makers of q do not
perhapsbecause
perceivetheacts of any of theotherstatesas threatening,
they are distantfrom or ideologicallyallied to them (see Postulate 3).
Given these auxiliary conditions,one would expect the empirical behavioral patternsof p and q to appear distinctfrom those of statesm,
i, and j. While the latter three would be expected to increase their
defense capacities or decrease their risks if the model were "true," p
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would remaininactivebecauseits decisionmakers'willingnessto act
wouldbe frustrated
bylackofcapability,
whileq wouldremaininactive
becauseit simplyis not motivatedto act. The actsof all fivestatesm,
i,}, p, and q in Table I are in factconsistent
withthe postulatethat
decisionmakersare operatingto establishfavorableCapacity-to-Risk
inequalities.'5

These observations
raisean important
pointthatis generallyoverlooked: correlations
and othersuch associationsmay not existamong
empiricalindicatorssimplybecausea givenprocessis operating.If the
security
dilemmaformulation
shownin Table 2 were"true,"statescould
reasonablybe expectedto behavedifferently.
The relationships
among
thetheoretical
conceptscouldbe general,butevenifthatwerethecase,
theoutcomesofthedecisionprocessesofdifferent
statescouldbe rather
heterogeneous.
Again, if the model were "true,"different
empirical
behaviorscould follow.
PROBLEM
THE OVERLOOKED

POSSIBILITIES
SOMETIMES

No.

2:

OF ALTERNATIVE
TRUE

TRIGGERS

AND

LAWS

forforeign
The problemcreatedbythepotential
policysubstitutability
is exacerbated
bythepracticeamonganalystsofequatinglaws,theories,
and modelswithuniversal--orat leasthighlygeneralizable-empirical
"truths."At one level,thisproblemarisesbecausetheoperationofeven
be evidentempirically.
universallaws may not invariably
Scholarsalreadyrecognizesomeof thereasonswhythiscould be thecase.'6Our
overlookedconcernhereis witha morefundamental-andgenerally
Put simply,analystsmaybe led astraywhen theyassociate
possibility.
'5Another reason why statesp and q are of interestderives fromthe so-called "empty
cell" problem.Instead of ignoringthe "nonbehaviors"of actors(the zeros or emptycells in
data matrices),analystsmight attemptto utilize the importantinformationconveyed by
such nonbehaviorswhen theyconstructand evaluatetheirmodels.For an empiricalexample
of thisphenomenonin which "neutral"war behaviorplays the key role in model structure
and evaluation,see Dina A. Zinnes and others,"From War to War: A StochasticModel
of Alignment Behavior" (Paper presentedat the Annual Meetings of the International
Studies Association,Philadelphia, I98I).
,6 Even thougha universalor "true" relationship
may exist,forexample,difficulties
with
indicatorvalidityand reliabilitycould mask thatassociationat the empiricallevel. In our
own earlierwork, we have suggestedthatadditionalcomplicationsmay develop as a result
of faultycase selectionproceduresor the failureto specifythecorrectlogical linkagesamong
the conceptsand indicators(see fn.8). Those problemsare critical.They raise doubts about
the standardapproach (see fn.7). To the extentthatsuch difficulties
exist,or at least cannot
be ruled out, the resultsof the testsbecome ambiguous. The lack of empiricalsupportin
a given analysiscould indeed implythata supposed law is not true,but it could also mean
that operation of a true law is obscured by the procedures adopted by the researcher
conductingthe test.
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laws and theorieswithquestionsof universaltruthor empiricalgeneralizationsbecausea given phenomenonmay occur fora varietyof
reasons.
distinct,
totallyincommensurable,
of foreignpolicysubstitution
suggeststhata
Justas the possibility
results(a one-to-many
mapping),the
givenfactormaylead to different
Different
processesmaylead tosimilar
logicalreverseis also imaginable.
results;different
factorsmay triggersimilarresponses(a many-to-one
optionsin theirpursuitof
mapping).If policymakerscan use different
theycan also adopt identicaloptionsfor
similargoals (i.e.,substitute),
goals.'7
different
reasons,or employsimilarmeansto pursuedifferent
One aspectof thealternative
trigger
problemis implicitin partA of
is easilycircumvented
Table i above;in thisguise,at least,thedifficulty
by employingexistingprocedures.As we showedin thatillustration,
themthstate'sincreasesin each roundcould plausiblybe expectedto
bytheithandjthstates;in a processofforeign
lead todifferent
responses
a given triggercould lead to different
empirical
policysubstitution,
reactions.The pointto be notedhereis thateventhoughthemthstate
electsto increaseits defensespendingin each round,we should not
necessarily
expectto findany singleempiricaltriggerforthe selection
of thatoption.If we assumethattheleadersof themthstateare conthenincreasesin defense
security
situation,
cernedwiththeircountry's
of an alliancebetweenthem,the
spendingby i and j, the formation
dissolutionof an alliance,effortsbyj to importarms,and certainly
attacksby theljthstateshouldall be expectedto contribute
to decisions
by leadersof themthstateto increasedefensecapabilities.
A secondaspectof the alternative
triggerproblemis perhapsmore
is less easilyresolved.Let us
important;in this form,the difficulty
imaginea world thatcomprisestwo setsof cases: thosecharacterized
by conditionA and thosethatare not,i.e.,a worldin whichthereare
7Bruce Bueno de Mesquita appears to have exactly this problem in mind when he
considersresearchon the outbreakof war and observes,
... the set of conditionssufficientfor war may be so large that its specificationis
virtuallyimpossible....
Most effortsto find the cause or causes of war focus on
environmentalcircumstancesthatcompel policymakersto wage war, but if we attempt
to show causal relationshipsbetweenenvironmentsand war, we are forcedto ignore
theroleofnationalleadersand to act as thoughnationswereno morethanautomatically
reactingmechanisms(Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap [New Haven: Yale University
Press, I98I], 4-5).
It is this line of argument-combined with his contentionthat decision makers are not
mechanisticallycompelled-that leads Bueno de Mesquita to conclude that the search for
the sufficientconditionsfor war should be abandoned in favorof a search for necessary
conditions.A similarpositionis suggestedby Singer (fn. i). Other related pointsare contributedby JamesR. Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement,"Public Policy i9 (Summer I971), 373-404; and, Ludwig Von Bertalanffy,
General
SystemsTheory(New York: Braziller, i968).
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A and -A cases. Presume that typeA case are those in which decision
makers are concerned with maintainingtheir states' national security,
while decision makersin -A politiespursueothergoals. Imagine further
that within the set of A cases, the developmentof an external risk (X
or any xi) is invariablysufficientfor an effortto resolve the security
problem (Y), but externalrisk is not necessaryforeffortsto resolve the
securityproblem because leaders are also concerned with through-time
deteriorationsin their defense capacities. Within the set of A states,Y
follows whereverand wheneverX (or any xi) occurs,but Y sometimes
occurs in the absence of X (or all xi). By contrast,when A is not present,
X (and the xi) do not lead to Y, and Y sometimesoccurs in the absence
of X (or all xi)."8 Finally, let us make the usual presumptionsregarding
the validityand reliabilityof the indicatorsand consider the following
possible case structure:'
Case i
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4

A
A
A
A

Case
Case
Case
Case

A
A
A
A

5
6
7
8

xi

-xi
-xi

xi

X2
-X2
X2

-xi

-X2

-xi
-xi

-X2

-xi

Case 9
Case io
Case ii
Case I2

-A
-A
-A
-A

xi
-xi

Case 13
Case I4
Case I5
Case i6

-A
-A

-xi

-A
-A

-X2

-xi

xi

-xi
-xi
-xi

-X2
-X2
-X2
X2
-X2
X2

-x3
-x3

x3
x3
-x3
-x3
-x3
-x3
-x3
-x3

x3
x3

-X2

-X2

-X2

-x3

-X2

-x3
-x3

-X2

X
X
X
X

Y
Y
Y
Y

-X
-X
-X
-X

Y
Y
Y
Y

X
X
X
X
-X

-X
-X
-X

-Y
-Y
-Y
-Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

8 Expressed
is oftheform,"GivenA, ifX (or anyxi),thenY (or
thehypothesis
simply,
butnotnecessary,
forY. IfA werea measuredvariable
anyyi"; i.e.,givenA,X is sufficient,
or axiomwhichis presumed
ratherthana theoretical
to be eithertrueor untrue,
postulate
"IfA and X (or anyxi),thenY (or anyyi); i.e.,A and
couldbe rewritten:
theproposition
sufficient
forY." Seenin thisfashion,
X are jointly
axiomsaresimply
dichotomous
variables
thatanalystseitherchooseor are forcedto leaveunmeasured.
This suggeststhataxioms
of universaltruth.They shouldinsteadbe
shouldin generalnotbe viewedas assertions
seenas antecedents
incomplex"if... , then. . ." statements
would
which,incollapsedform,
read:"If thespecified
axiomsare truefora givencase,thenthemodelshouldapply."Once
thisis seen,we can movequicklybeyonddebatesovertheuniversal
of the
truthor falsity
thequestionof thetruthor falsity
themselves:
of themodelis putaside.We
assumptions
forgenerality
can evenmovebeyondconcerns
and becomemoredirectly
with
concerned
casesin whichtheaxiomsare trueand in whichthemodelshouldtherefore
(a) identifying
be useful,and (b) developing
modelsthathold underalternative
setsof
complementary

initialaxioms.

9 It is perhapsworthnotingthatthisillustration
entailsan important
assimplifying
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Even forthose analystswho recognize both the substitutability
problem and the firsttypeof alternativetriggerproblemand thereforeelect
to focus on Y and X ratherthan exclusivelyon the occurrenceof any
one of the yi or xi, interpretationof the patternwould not be a simple
matterif theyignored theA/-A bifurcationof the set of cases and were
concernedonly with the X/Y relationship.Put simply,applicationof the
standardprocedureswould lead themeitherto rejectthe hypothesisthat
X generallyleads to Y or to underestimatetheimportanceof thatlinkage.
Within the domain circumscribedby the presenceof A (cases i to 8
above), however,X is sufficientforY. Outside thatdomain, X does not
lead to Y (cases 9 to i6). The occurrencesof Y in the -A domain must
be triggeredby somethingelse. Knowing about X or any xi does not
help.
That said, however, the point should be clear. While the X/Y hypothesisis not general,it is neverthelessa perfectlysound indeed, even
"lawlike"- propositionwithin its domain of applicability(the cases in
set A). Although ultimatelywe should like to develop an explanation
thatapplies to all sixteenof the cases above, no additional work-either
theoreticalor empirical-is necessaryto account for the firsteight.
Thus, thereare two differentways to approach the cases above. One
is to develop and test hypothesesthat are expected at the outset to be
general or applicable to the universeof cases. Such a method would be
consistentwith currentpracticesand the standard approach in which
generalizations are found by aiming directlyat them. Unfortunately,
that strategyseems to reduce to an all-or-nothingsituationin which we
are forcedto play to weakness; to explain completelyany occurrenceof
a phenomenon,we must account for all occurrences.
The otherstrategyis to develop and testhypothesesthatare expected
to hold only under certain conditions (e.g., A or -A; when decision
makers seek to maintain theirnational security,and when theydo not).
Although we are ultimatelyinterestedin accountingforall occurrences
of a phenomenon, the immediate (somewhat counterintuitive)strategy
would entail an initial considerationof what relationshipsshould hold
when,and a focus on only those cases in which the conditionspertain.
Once those occurrences were explained, we could move on, perhaps
developing verydifferentmodels that would be applicable to the other
sumption:stateshave the opportunityto act whenevertheyare willingto do so. Under the
unifiedactor/nationalsecuritydilemma formulationoutlined in Table 2, we would expect
eitherincreasingexternalrisksor decreasingdefensecapacityto contributeto the leaders'
willingnessto resolve the securityproblem if the change in either factoris sufficientto
reversepreviouslypositiveCapacity-to-Riskinequalities.Whetheror not thedecisionmakers
would act on that disposition,however,would be affectedby theirobjectiveopportunities
to act.
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cases. This domain-specifictheoryapproach would thus let us play to
strength;rather than having to account for the phenomenon Y both
when decision makers are and are not concerned with their states'
securitydilemmas, we could conclude that there are occurrencesthat
are explicable (i.e., those in the A set) and others whose explanation
requires more theoreticaland empirical research(i.e., those in the -A
set). Rather than resting progress on the isolation of one explanation
that holds forall, this approach allows us to move ahead by identifying
an explanation that holds for some.
Let us consider now the unifiedactor/security
dilemma formulation
discussed above (see Table 2). Among other things,thatmodel specifies
that decision makers are motivatedto establishthe inequalityexpressed
in Axiom 3: Cnt > Rnt. It suggeststhatdecision makers want theirstates
to be unconditionallyviable; it would be consistentwith theirattempts
to maintain at least local supremacy.20
If we presume forthe purpose of argumentthatat least some decision
makers in at least some settingsdo in fact key their decisions to that
inequality,we come up against an obvious problem. With verylittlein
the way of data analysis,we know that thereare (or in principle,could
be) statesthatact to increasetheirdefensecapabilitiesand decrease their
risks at given times even though they have already so clearly satisfied
the inequalityand establishedtheirunconditionalviabilitythat the acts
of otherstatesdo not reverseit. Because such stateshave already attained
theirgoal, the motivationthatpresumablydrivesdecision makers is lost;
the antecedentconditionin Postulate 4 (i.e., the conditionCnt, < Rnt,)
would simplynever be established.Even thoughthe model would therefore be adequate for accounting for the behaviors of states such as m,
i, andj in Table I, it would leave totallyunexplained the behaviors of
states that are already convincinglyviable.
Still assuming, then, that the formulationin Table i is useful for
accounting for the decisions of some states,but also concluding that it
could not logicallybe expectedto account forthe decisions of all polities,
we are in a difficultsituationif the goal is to discover a single, general
formulationthatapplies to all cases both throughtime and across space.
Even though the axioms of the model might be valid for some cases
and the model's postulatesmightalways hold within thatdomain, current practiceswould lead us to reject the model because neitherit nor
the relationshipsit implies are universally"true." Put more squarely, a
model that mightbe perfectlyadequate forexplaining what happens in
20

See Kenneth Boulding, Conflictand Defense(New York: Harper Torchbooks, i962).
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some well-defined
cases might be abandoned because it does not always

apply or help to explain all cases.
The importanceof this point becomes more apparent once we recognize that a varietyof other motive assumptionscould be postulated
to characterize decision-makingprocesses. One such possibilitywould
be a variation on the national-securitymodel in Table 2; rather than
attemptingto establishthe Cnt > Rnt inequality,decision makers could
be posited as seeking the maintenance of the status quo so that the
Capacity-to-Riskratio at any time is at least equal to that of an earlier
period. (Such a modifiednational-securityformulationmight be applicable to statesthatcontinueto increasetheirdefensecapacityand reduce
the threatengendered by theiropponentseven thoughtheyare already
unconditionallyviable; it mightbe consistentwith the illusoryquest for
perfectsecurityor with the securitydilemma of never knowing how
much capabilityis enough.) In contrastto such national-securitymotivations,one could posit "domestic" viabilitymodels in which decision
makers seek eitherto maintain enough political strengthto keep from
being deposed by theirdomesticoppositionor to maintain at least their
prior position vis-a-visdomestic threats.Other goals, and indeed combinations of several goals, could also be presented; any one of them
could provide a rationale for expecting that decision makers might
increase theirmilitaryexpenditures,create alliances, dissolve them,import arms, open negotiations,launch preemptivemilitarystrikes,and so
on. Differentprocesses, including a number that depart from an assumption of unified,value-maximizingdecision makers, could lead to
similar results.
A considerationof such alternativeformulationssuggestsseveral importantpoints. First,thereis the partitioningrole of axioms. Although
there are probably some actual cases in which decision makers pursue
almost any goal thatone mightreasonablywish to posit,theremay also
be instancesin which decision makers are motivatedby otherconcerns.
To the extent that this seems plausible, such alternativemotive forces
or goals would not in any senseconstitutethebases forrivalor competing
models. To be sure, one of the motive assumptionsmight be true for
more cases than the others. If so, the formulationappropriate to that
axiom would be more usefulthan the othermodels. The point,however,
is that it would probablynot be plausible to argue that any one of the
motiveaxioms is always true.Thus, it would not be reasonable to expect
any of the models to be universallyapplicable. We would thereforenot
be inclined to conduct a criticaltest in order to discover which is the
more general. Instead, we would be interestedin exploringwhetheror
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not a given model applies to a given, well-definedcase or set of cases.
Second, if differentprocessesdo indeed lead to similar concreteempirical behaviors,the conceptreflectedby one such act could be different
within differentformulations.If the decision makers are dealing with
a national viabilityor securitydilemma,forexample, an increasein their
defense expendituresor the formationof an alliance would be interpretableas-and more importantly,serve as an indicatorof-efforts to
increase their state's defense capacity or to decrease the foreign risks
with which they perceive it to be confronted;if they are seeking to
resolve a simple governmentalviabilityproblem, on the other hand,
those same acts would reflecteffortsto increase their government's
strengthor to decrease the degree to which it is threatenedby domestic
forces. Even though analysts may tend to view acts as inherentlyor
intrinsically
fallingon some fixedscale betweenconflictand cooperation,
it mightmake more
or betweenfriendlyand hostilebehaviors,therefore,
sense to interpretthe actions of decision makers in the contextof what
theyare attemptingto accomplish.
Third, and perhaps most important,the argument suggests that it
may be usefulto expectthattruesocial laws maynotalwayshold, operate,
or apply empirically.There may well be a varietyof social laws, each
of which is true, but which should be expected to hold only under
certain-perhaps very special-conditions. Although it is possible that
universal,always true, laws exist and we believe that scholars should
continue their effortsto identifythem, it is difficultto think of very
many empirical universals that have been identifiedeven by physical
scientists.Thus, it may be usefulto recognize that therecould verywell
be laws that are in some sense "good," "domain-specific,"or "nice,"
even though the relationshipstheyimplyare not necessarilyempirically
general.21Rather than assuming that there need be a single "always
true" law thataccountsfora given phenomenonwheneverand wherever
it has occurred or will occur, it may be more productive to think of
several laws, each of which is always true under certain conditions (or
within certain domains), but which is only sometimestrue empirically
because those conditionsdo not always hold in the empirical world. It
might be more profitableto distinguishbetween the truthfulnessof a
relationshipand the question of whether or not it holds in a given
instance. Although the identificationof universal relationshipsis still a
2 Technically,it is not necessaryto use words and phrases such as "domain-specific"or
nice in connectionwithlaws. They are used hereonlyto emphasize our pointthatanalysts
may err if they necessarilyequate laws with universals(see fn. 22 below). The adjective
"nice" is used in similarfashionby G. RobertBoynton,"On GettingfromHere to There:
Reflectionson Two Paradigms and Other Things," in Ostrom (fn. i2), 29-68.
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worthwhile
goal,it maybe usefulto considerotherresearchobjectives
and perhapsmoreattainable.22
thatare equallyimportant
of course,analystsmay developseveralmodels,each of
Ultimately,
conwhichmay serveto explaina givenphenomenonunderdifferent
whyY occursin both
ditions.When thatoccurs whenwe understand
theA and -A domains it maybe possibleto integrate
or synthesize
In theinterim,
however,we shouldplay
thoseislandsofunderstanding.
to strength;
we shouldlearnnot to rejector disregardan explanation
thatis onlysometimestrue.
SOME

CONSEQUENCES

FOR THE STUDY

OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

In recentyears,JamesN. Rosenauhas become
Cumulation
andtheory.
cumulationand theorybuildingin interconcernedwith integrative
Because the pointsdepartso sharplyfromacceptedargumentsand assumptions,it may
be worthwhileto consider the followingobservationsfrom scholars who use somewhat
differentterms,but come to identicalconclusions:
There is a widespread misconceptionthat theoriesare either "true" or "false." A
numberof examples in physicalscience stand in directcontradictionto this. . .. Each
of thesetheoriesor models is tautologicallytrue,whentheirpostulatesare fulfilled....
They are not theoriesto be confirmedor disconfirmedin general,but only confirmed
or disconfirmedin specificapplications.As a result,theyare not theorieswhichexplain
"how people behave"; theyare theoriesor models which describehow people behaved
in thisor thatcircumstance.. . one fruitfulline of development. . . will be not to ask
what is the theoryof a certain kind of behavior,or what are the postulateswhich
correctlydescribea general area of behavior.The tacticproposed here is to set about
developing and applying a number of sometimes-truetheorieswhich relate consequences to postulates,and which mayadequatelydescribebehaviorin a given situation
(Coleman [fn.6], 5i6-i8; emphasis in original).
22

... the laws of mathematicswere inventedtoo. The only demand made on them is
laws mayoperate.
contexts,
different
thatof consistencyin a givencontext.But in different
Therefore,any statementof mathematicsis valid or invalidnotbecause certainrelations
are true or not true in the real world, but because these statementsare or are not
consequencesof certaindefinitionsand assumptions,which we are freeto choose. The
ambiguityof a mathematicalstatementresultsfroma failureto specifywith sufficient
precisionthe exact contextin which the statementis made (Anatol Rapoport,Fights,
Gamesand Debates [Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press, i960], 297-98; emphasis
added).
Laws of nature . . . are different:to them the words "true," "probable" and the like
hyposeem to have no application. ... [We could] adopt Snell's formulatentatively,
thetically,as a guide to furtherexperimentsto see whetherthe phenomena always
true or false?" meaning,
happen so. On this level, we mightask "Is Snell's hypothesis
"Have any limitationsbeen foundto the applicationof his formula?"But verysoonhas been established-the formulain our hypothesis
indeed as soon as its fruitfulness
comes to be treatedas a law, i.e., as somethingof which we ask not "Is it true?" but
"When does it hold?" When thishappens,it becomespartof the frameworkof optical
theory,and is treatedas a standard.Departures fromthe law and limitationson its
scope ... come to be spoken of as anomalies and thoughtof as things in need of
of Science:An Introduction
explanation(Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy
[New York:
Harper Torchbooks, I953], 78-79; emphasis in original).
Similar points have been made by Boynton (fns. I2 and 2i), and Ostrom (fn. I2) and
"Introduction:Making Sense Out of a Muddle," in Gillespie and Zinnes (fn. I2), 37-4I.
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national relations.Perceived lack of progressin this area has prompted
Dina Zinnes to inquire about why there has apparentlybeen so little
cumulation. Hopmann, Zinnes, and Singer have noted the need to assemble diverse pieces of evidence. Other analysts have considered the
unconnectednature of the existingislands of theoryand called fortheir
integration.23

Our discussion has attemptedto delineate a particular impediment
to cumulation: The generalfailureto conceptualizequestionsand indicators
broadlyenoughto capturethe relationships
and processesthatscholarsare
in studying.We have argued that the islands of theory
actuallyinterested
extant in the internationalrelationsliteraturehave been too narrowly
conceived for answering the questions that have been asked; we have
suggested that analysts' ways of theorizing and perhaps even their
expectationsabout the resultsof such efforts may have been inappropriate for dealing with the problems at hand. Analystshave lost their
perspective,perhaps as a consequence of the abandonment of grand
theory,theireffortsto develop middle-rangeformulations,or theiradoption of the even narrowerhypothesis-testing
procedures that were fostered by the empirical "third wave" of the i96os and 1970s.
We have offereda number of specificrecommendationsabout what
should be done. Two remedies should be reemphasized. First, scholars
should endeavor to merge the rigor and systematizationof scientific
inquiry with the broader, grand theoreticalconceptualizations of the
and domain-specificlaws
traditionalliteraturein which substitutability
were at least implicitlyrecognized. Second, analystsshould begin to pay
more carefulattentionto basic epistemologicalissues.24Nothing we have
said casts doubt on existingresearchpracticesor suggeststhey should
be abandoned. Our point is only that those practices,drawn as theyare
fromother disciplinesthat are concernedwith other typesof problems,
should be utilized with circumspection.Even though scholarsare often
impatientwith epistemologicalissues and findthemselvesanxious to get
on with theiranalyses,theyshould bear in mind thathow theyapproach
theirproblems the manner in which theyconceptualize them and the
23Rosenau, ed., In Searchof Global Patterns(New York: The Free Press, I973), Hopmann
and others(fn. ii), and Zinnes (fn. io). Scholars such as Singer and Russetthave argued
that analysts'collectiveresearcheffortsare beginningto add up: J. David Singer (fn. I),
and Singer,"Tribal Sins on the QIP Reservation,"in Rosenau (above), i67-73, and Bruce
M. Russett,"InternationalInteractionsand InternationalProcesses: The State of the Discipline" (Paper presentedat the Annual Meetingsof the American Political Science Association,Denver, i982).
24 A similar point has been made recently
in Bueno de Mesquita (fn. I7) and "Theories
ofInternationalConflict:An Analysisand an Appraisal,"in Ted RobertGurr,ed., Handbook
of Political Conflict(New York: The Free Press, I980), 36i-98.
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methodstheyutilizein theirattemptsto solve them-will ultimately
impingeon theirresults.If apparently
distinctforeignpoliciescould be
responsesto similarproblemsas a resultof substitutability,
and similar
foreignpoliciescould be responsesto different
problemsas a resultof
theoperationof domain-specific
laws,thenwe mayneed to rethinkthe
acceptedprocedures.
Microleveldecisionalanalysisand process.We have tried to do more

than issue yet anothercall for theory,for more fruitful
mergingof
of our
tradition
and science,or forgreaterattention
to theimplications
methods.As in ourotherwork,we havesuggested
herethata particular
typeof theoretical
development
mightbe especiallyuseful.Following
TheodoreAbel,and usingtheworkof theSproutsas a startingpoint,
both"opportunity"
conand "willingness"
are positedas fundamental
Each state'sobjectiveopportunities
therange
siderations.25
circumscribe
of possibleacts and behaviorsavailableto its decisionmakers.In the
ofstatesdefinetheir"menus
termsofRussettand Starr,theopportunities
forchoice."26
Becausethefactors
thatcreateor precludedifferent
options
are differentially
distributed
acrossstatesand evenwithinstatesthrough
time,such concernsare in some senselikelyto be importantforuncould
A focuson suchattributes
derstanding
theirpolicyundertakings.
intothebasicparameters
or limitsoftheforeignpolicies
provideinsights
of different
countries.
To theextentthatanalysts
in theparameters
within
are lessinterested
whichstatesoperateand are ultimately
more concernedwithunderstandingwhycertainoptionsare adoptedat particulartimes,however,
our contention
is thata focuson theattributes
of stateswillnotsuffice.
In this,we agreewithWaltz that
... different
stateshave producedsimilaras well as different
outcomes,
and similarstateshave produceddifferent
as well as similaroutcomes.
The samecausessometimes
lead to different
effects,
and thesame effects
sometimesfollowfromdifferent
causes.27

Expressedin our terms,it appearsthata focuson attributes
could tell
us whatstatescan do, and therefore
possiblywhattheaggregateprobabilitiesare thatcertaintypesof eventswill occurin a givengroupor
cannottellus, however,which
sampleof states.A focuson attributes
stateswilldo what,or whentheywilldo it.Certainobjective
particular
25Abel, "The Element of Decision in the Patternof War," AmericanSociologicalReview
6 (December I941), 853-59; Sprout and Sprout (fn. I3).
Bruce Russettand Harvey Starr,WorldPolitics:The Menu For Choice (San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman, i98i).
27 Waltz (fn. I), 3726
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capabilities may be necessaryfor a foreign policy initiation,but they
forthatundertaking unless,that
should not be expectedto be sufficient

ofall
willingto avail themselves
is,decisionmakersare homogeneously
The problemis thatit does notseemreasonableto
theiropportunities.
expectall foreignpolicymakersin all statesto pursueidenticalgoals.28
It is the recognition
of thisproblemthatleads Waltz to reject"reductionist"
or "analytic"theoriesfocusedon theindividual,decisional,
or nationallevelsof analysis,and to argue insteadfora systemicaptheorists
proach.29
While we agreewithWaltz and othersystems-level
on the problem,and also concludethatstaticanalysesof the attributes
We
ourown solutionis quitedifferent.
ofstateswillnotbringprogress,
ofstatesmaydefinetherange
arguethat,whiletheobjectivecapabilities
of possibilities,progresscan be made by understandingtheprocessesby

whichdecisionmakerschoosecertainoptionsoverothers.This suggests
that we mightusefullyfollowBueno de Mesquita'sexpectedutility
and studyhow decisionmakersselectfromamongvarying
approach3o
substitutable
alternatives,
setsof available,potentially
payingparticular
or
that
we
couchin terms
attention
to thecognitive perceptual
processes
and thatthe Sproutscast in termsof "cognitivebeof "willingness,"
we need to consider how the willingness
haviorism."3'Put differently,

of statesinteract
to produceforeignpolicybehaviors.
and opportunities
28 Singer,himselfa long-timeproponentof the systemic
level approach and the view that
foreignpolicydecisionmakersmay at least initiallybe presumedto be ratherhomogeneous,
comes close to thispoint in reviewingthe realpolitik,arms race,power transition,economic
development,and imperialismmodels:
... at rock bottomthe most importantdifferenceamongst the contendingcauses of
war models is thatof theforeignpolicydecisionprocess.That is,each model assumesoftenimplicitly-a differentclass of decision makers in power and each postulatesa
differentset of decision rules. . .. Note thatwe have assumed, to thisjuncture,a high
degree of homogeneityin decision makers and the rules they employ, but to move
closerto a full explanation,thatassumptionwould have to be relaxed(Singer [fn. I], I4I5, emphasis added).
See also J. David Singer, "The Level-of-AnalysisProblem in InternationalRelations," in
Rosenau (fn. I3), 20-29.
29 Waltz (fn. I), esp. pp. 37 and 65.
3 Bueno de Mesquita (fn. I7).
3 One critiqueof Waltz (fn. i) is thathe has underestimated
the cognitivelinks between
social entitiesand theirenvironments.The environment-the internationalsystem-is important.Types of internationalsystemscould (but need not) be conceptualizedas operating
to definedomains such as theA and -A contextsdicussed in our example in the previous
section.Nevertheless,Waltz artificially
separatesthe "entity"and the "environment,"using
the Sprouts'termsforthe "ecological triad" (Sproutand Sprout,fn. I3). He seems to ignore
relationship,whichmusthave a cognitive
the thirdleg of thattriad,the entity-environment
component.The "enduringanarchiccharacterof internationalpolitics"(fn. i, p. 66), which
he regardsas the centralfactorin the analysis,cannotexplain the variance in behavior.

